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Abstract Deontic, as opposed to evaluative buck-passing theories seem to be easier
to accept, since there appears to be an intimate connection between deontic prop-
erties, such as ‘ought’, ‘requirement’, and ‘permission’ on the one hand, and nor-
mative reasons on the other. However, it is far from obvious what, precisely, the
connection consists in, and this topic has suffered from a paucity of discussion. This
paper seeks to address that paucity by providing a novel deontic buck-passing view,
one that avoids the pitfalls both of the most straightforward view on the matter
(what I call the ‘‘standard view’’) as well as a recently articulated view, due to Matt
Bedke. It does so by appealing first to the distinction between a reason for, and a
reason against, and uses this distinction to clarify what are taken to be two fun-
damental, but distinct, deontic properties—ought and requirement. The resulting
view allows us to capture these properties, the structural relations between them,
and does so in a way that avoids making supererogation impossible.
Keywords Deontic properties  Reasons  Normative  Normativity  Buck-passing 
Requirements  Oughts
1 Introduction
Recent work on normativity has seen an interest in extending the much-discussed
buck-passing analysis of evaluative properties (such as good, bad, better, worse) to
deontic properties (such as ought, permissible, required). According to a commonly
expressed view, the all-in deontic property ought can be given the following
analysis:
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Standard view A ought to U if, and only if, A has most reason to U, where to
have most reason to U is for the reasons which favour A’s U-
ing to be stronger than the reasons against A’s U-ing
There are two important objections to the standard view. The first objection is that
the standard view appears to make supererogation impossible. Suppose that it is
supererogatory for A to give almost all of her annual income to charities providing
aid to starving people. That is, although she would be praiseworthy if she did that, it
is false that she ought to do it. Doing so would be ‘above and beyond the call of
duty’.
Given a typical way of understanding normative reasons, if the suffering of those
that could be saved by A provides her with a reason to donate, then the greater the
extent of that suffering, the weightier the reason she has. Thus, it is possible to
imagine that this reason is strong enough to outweigh any other reasons that A has.
But if there can be a case in which A has most reason to donate almost all of her
income to the charity, according to the standard view, she therefore ought to donate
almost all of her income. But it is plausible that if anything is a supererogatory act,
donating almost all of one’s income to charity is a supererogatory act. Thus, the
standard view is false because it falsely implies that A’s donating almost all their
income to charity is not a supererogatory act.
The second objection to the standard view is that it fails to capture two distinct
senses of ‘ought’. Sometimes, when you have most reason to U, that implies that U-
ing is thereby no longer (rationally, morally, prudentially) optional for you.
Consider:
Lunch A promises her friend B that she will meet B for lunch at 12 pm
tomorrow, but A would rather spend the afternoon at home watching
television. A knows that she has more reason to keep her promise than
to satisfy her desire to watch television
According to the standard view, in Lunch A ought to meet B for lunch at 12 pm.
That seems the right result, in the sense that, all else being equal, it is because A
made a promise to B, that A’s keeping that promise is not optional for A. It is
required of A that, having made her promise, she keep it. But this isn’t the only
usage of ‘ought’ we are familiar with. Consider now:
Theatre A is deciding whether to go to the cinema, go to the theatre, or to stay
home and read a book tonight. Although she has good reasons to
choose any of these alternatives, she has a little bit more reason to go
to the theatre, as she hasn’t been there for months
According to the standard view, in Theatre A ought to go to the theatre. But it is at
the very least an open question whether A is thereby required to go to the theatre
just because she has a little bit more reason to go. We might more felicitously say
that in Theatre, A’s going to the theatre comes highly recommended, and is what
one might advise A to do. The problem for the standard view is that, as it stands, it is
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unable to discriminate between the requirement claim in Lunch and the ought claim
in Theatre.
In this paper, I shall outline a better deontic buck-passing view than the standard
view; one that avoids these two objections. To do so, I utilise the distinction
between a reason for and a reason against. In Sect. 2 I shall argue for this
distinction, and offer my own, positive, interpretation of that distinction, which
diverges from the most prominent interpretation, due to Greenspan.1 As I
understand the distinction, we can distinguish a reason for from a reason against,
not by appealing to criticism, but by appealing to reactive attitudes.
After having argued for and sketched this distinction, in Sect. 3 I use it to analyse
the deontic properties of ought and requirement in terms of normative reasons. In
Sect. 4 I argue that the resulting view can account not only for the distinction
between the two deontic properties, but that it can capture the structural relations
between these properties.2 I argue that this gives my view an advantage over the
other most prominent example of a deontic buck-passing view, due to Matt Bedke.3
In Sect. 5 I demonstrate how my view can resolve the supererogation problem,
and in Sect. 6 I conclude.
2 Reasons for and reasons against
2.1 Motivating and arguing for the position
To resolve the problems outlined above for the deontic buck-passing view, I appeal
to the distinction between reasons for and reasons against. Since few philosophers
have explicitly discussed this distinction,4 and many philosophers implicitly accept
an equivalence of some sort between these relations it behoves me to justify its use.
To argue that the distinction is a real one, my strategy is to identify what
equivalences there could be between reasons for and reasons against, and to argue
that those equivalences are untenable.5 Here are two tempting ways to understand
the identification of reasons against with reasons for: we might (a) understand a
reason against U-ing as equivalent to a reason for W-ing (an alternative, or set of
alternatives to U-ing); on the other hand, we might (b) understand a reason against
U-ing as equivalent to a reason for not W-ing.6
There are serious difficulties facing the first interpretation. First, this equivalence
does not respect the plausible thought that normative reasons generally bear only on
the response that they favour. For example, the fact that the play running at the
1 See Greenspan (2004).
2 This difficulty is articulated by Snedegar in Snedegar (2016).
3 See Bedke (2011).
4 For discussion see Gert (2003), Greenspan (2004), and Snedegar (2018).
5 Snedegar pursues a similar strategy in Snedegar (2018).
6 See Snedegar (2016, 2017) for discussion of these alternatives. Snedegar calls (a) the opportunity cost
principle.
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theatre on Monday has had dreadful reviews is thereby a reason not to go to see that
play, but that same fact—that the play has had dreadful reviews—is not thereby a
reason to, say, play golf.
To put more flesh on that idea, we tend to think that a normative reason plays a
normative-cum-explanatory role. That the play has had dreadful reviews not only
disfavours going, but also explains why it makes sense not to go. One fruitful way to
understand how a normative reason can play that role is that, where a reason favours
an action, it tells us something about that action that is worth doing. In order to play
that justificatory-cum-explanatory role, the reason must bear on its object and not,
directly, on other objects.7
This interpretation of the equivalence has not, however, gained much traction
among normative theorists. The second interpretation of the equivalence, however,
appears more intuitive. Suppose again, that the bad reviews of the play are a reason
against seeing it on Monday. Is it not the case that the fact that the play has received
bad reviews is a reason for not seeing the play on Monday? This purported
equivalence seems much more secure, so we must spend more time dislodging this
idea if the asymmetry of for and against is to be found acceptable.
The first doubt that I have about this version of the equivalence is that it is guilty
of a failing of the first interpretation; namely, that it falls foul of the general thesis
that reasons bear only on their object, not on alternatives to that object. Above, I
questioned the idea that a fact F being against one action is generally equivalent to F
being for another action. By the same token, it is doubtful that F’s being against an
action is generally equivalent to that F being for an omission. Again, the driving
force behind that idea is that a reason plays the justificatory-cum-explanatory role
because it tells us what about that action, or about that omission is worth doing, or
worth refraining from. But these are different objects, with different properties.
Consider the following illustration: suppose that the fact that it shows your steely
resolve is a reason for refraining from taking the drug. Here, we have a reason which
supports the case for the omission. Now suppose that the fact that the drug is
addictive is a reason against taking the drug. Here, we have a reason which
undermines the case for the action. According to the second interpretation of the for/
against equivalence, these reasons both function as reasons for the omission, and
both function as reasons against the action. But that seems questionable at best.
Furthermore, the difference between act and omission bears on the determination
of the strength of a reason. For example, it is a plausible thought that the strength of
your normative reasons is modified by the difficulty of acting on them. Suppose that
you are addicted to the drug, so that it is difficult to refrain from taking it, and easy
to take it. Then a reason which bears on the omission—not taking the drug—will be
harder to achieve that the action—taking the drug. The ability of the agent to
perform the action differs from their ability to perform the omission, with
consequences for the strengths of the reasons appropriate to each.
7 Further, as Snedegar and others have pointed out, a reason against U cannot generally be a reason for
some or all alternatives to U because those alternatives may be worse with respect to the goal or aim in
virtue of which A U’s. See Snedegar (2018: 733 and passim).
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That normative reasons take a single object is important, then. An omission is a
different object, with different properties, to an action, and thus should plausibly be
treated differently.
2.2 How do I understand the distinction?
I have argued cursorily that the for/against distinction is a real one, but have as yet
said little about how that distinction should be characterised. Let me now situate
how I conceive of the distinction alongside another view on what the distinction
amounts to.
Patricia Greenspan develops a view on which the for/against (or negative/positive in
Greenspan’s terminology) distinction should be understood as closely tied to the notion of
rationality.8 According to Greenspan, a negative reason that counts against an option
‘tends to rule it out’ and that ‘[k]nowingly acting against such a [negative] reason without
strong enough opposing reasons, is the paradigm of practical irrationality’.9 Positive
reasons, on the other hand, merely rationally permit responding to options by ‘rendering an
option eligible for choice […] without requiring it.10
Furthermore, Greenspan’s target notion of rationality is to be understood in terms
of the offering and answering of criticisms. Negative reasons are the sorts of things
that make appropriate criticism for failing to respond to them, while positive reasons
are the sorts of things that can answer such criticisms.11 This conception of reasons,
(which she calls the ‘critical conception’) as being in the business of answering and
offering criticisms is intended to be exhaustive: ‘[a]ll that rationality requires is
fending off criticism’.12
However, I think it is a mistake to try to understand a normative reason in terms
of rationality. First, the notion of rationality is more diffuse and unclear than that of
the notion of a consideration counting in favour or against a response. If that is right
then basing arguments for the for/against distinction on the basis of intuitions about
what counts as rational or irrational in cases (as both Greenspan and Gert do in
arguing for their positions) is a non-starter.
Second, I’m not convinced that we exhaust all of the sorts of things that reasons can
do by appealing primarily to the notion of criticism. Even if Greenspan’s distinction
does pick out two ways in which reasons bear on their objects, the distinction surely
does not exhaust the ways in which we understand such strengths. Consider, for
8 See Greenspan (2004) and Greenspan (2007). In Gert (2003), Gert develops a structurally similar view
to Greenspan.
9 Greenspan (2004: 387–8)
10 Greenspan (2004: 389), see also Raz (2011: 5–6)
11 Gert advocates a structurally similar view. He distinguishes between justifying and requiring strengths
of reasons, where the strengths of reasons should be understood in terms of rationality. Positive reasons
for Greenspan correspond to justifying strength for Gert: for a reason to have justifying strength is for it to
contribute to making an otherwise irrational act rational. In other words, justifying strength defends
against potential rational criticisms that would otherwise be applicable to an agent who acted in that way.
See Gert (2003).
12 Greenspan (2004: 389), see also Greenspan (2011: 173).
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instance, simple pairwise comparisons between options that share a value base: that
the 12 year old Laphroaig is tastier than the 8 year old Glenkinchie implies that you
have stronger reason to drink the Laphroaig. One way to understand the strength of that
reason is in terms of the underlying value of choosing that option. But the normative
force of that claim doesn’t seem to bear any necessary connection to defending oneself
against potential criticism. Sure enough, the fact that the Laphroaig is tastier may
provide a sensible defence of your decision to drink it, but if we are looking for an
explanation of the strength of your reason, the fact you can defend your decision looks
downstream from the fact that it is more valuable.
Consider another example. Jonathan Dancy identifies a subset of reasons as of an
‘‘enticing’’ variety.13 They are such that they would be pleasant to do, but no matter
how strong they are, they never make it the case that you ought to act on their basis.
Suppose that the fact that it is a pleasant day is a reason to go for a walk. That reason
doesn’t seem to be the sort of thing that rules out other options, but neither is it
necessarily playing the role of a defence against potential criticism.
You are not failing to understand the normative situation if you do not take the
fact that it is a pleasant day as material to defend yourself against the potential
charge that you are doing a rationally criticisable thing. It seems at best like a stretch
to treat this reason as if this were its primary ‘‘function’’. So it is questionable
whether all normative questions answerable by reasons are reducible to questions
about giving and answering criticisms.
So we are left with a problem unresolved: if reasons against U-ing are not
reducible to reasons for not U-ing, and the critical conception is not plausible then
how should we understand the asymmetry of normative reasons? The critical
conception gains most of its plausibility with respect to its account of reasons
against. If criticism enters into the picture it seems obvious that it will be here. But
(1) this doesn’t force us to accept that reasons for play a merely defensive role, and
(2) explaining the asymmetry in terms of rationality still seems like a wrong move.
Here is one alternative possibility: we pick out the for/against distinction by
appealing to reactive attitudes in an identifying role.
Most theorists recognise a distinction between positive, negative, and neutral
reactive attitudes, and that these are non-interchangeable, distinct attitudes that can be
held towards the same object. One way to shed light on the distinction between reasons
for and reasons against, then, is to appeal to the attitudes that it is appropriate to hold
towards an agent for whom those reasons are relevant. A plausible generalisation
might be: where A has undefeated reason against U-ing and, nevertheless, U’s, A is
appropriately subject to others’ holding negative reactive attitudes towards A, as well
as it being appropriate for A to hold negative reactive attitudes towards themselves.14
On the other hand, where A has undefeated reason for U-ing and they fail to U, it is
generally at most appropriate only for A to hold negative reactive attitudes (such as
regret) towards themselves.
13 See Dancy (2004a).
14 In Strawson’s terminology, the former would count as ‘‘personal’’ reactive attitudes, and the latter
‘‘self’’ reactive attitudes. See Strawson (1974).
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This alternative view gives us the starting materials with which to distinguish
reasons for and reasons against. In this way, we can avoid the complaint that we
must appeal to a more imprecise notion (rationality) than reasons, to explain
reasons, and it gives us an alternative to conceiving of reasons and reasoning as a
primarily defensive operation. The view also does not claim to be a reductive
account of reasons. We can appeal to reactive attitudes to allow us to identify the
valency of a normative reason, without thereby implying that normative reasons are
reducible to the appropriateness of holding those attitudes.15
3 A better buck-passing view
In this section I formulate my version of the deontic buck passing view. To prepare
the ground for the analysis, we need first to be sensitive to two ways in which
reasons can combine—two verdictive claims: first, reasons can be weighed for and
against the same response; second, the net verdict of reasons against can be weighed
against the net verdict of reasons for an alternative response. I call the former
verdictive claim, having sufficient reason:
Sufficient reason A has sufficient reason to U if, and only if, the reasons for
A’s U-ing outweigh the reasons against A’s U-ing
Where, conversely, to have sufficient reason not to U is for A’s reasons against U-
ing to outweigh A’s reasons for U-ing. Second, call the latter verdictive claim
having greater reason:
Greater reason A has greater reason to U if, and only if, there is more net
reason for A to U than to W (where W is an alternative, or set
of alternatives to U-ing)
Again, where, conversely, having greater reason against U-ing is for there to be
more net reason against U than to W.
In formulating my version of the deontic buck-passing view I make use of both of
these verdictive claims, in addition to the distinction between reasons for and
reasons against. Let me begin by first stating my analyses of requirement and ought,
and I shall then comment on them at length. To anticipate, in an intuitive sense, a
requirement functions to rule out courses of action. On the other hand, where an
agent ought to do something, this (very roughly) expresses the idea that it would be
15 What about epistemic reasons? Is having evidence against p and nevertheless believing p somehow
epistemically worse/more blameworthy than having evidence for q and not believing that q? In general I
think there may be a parallel here: if you have evidence against p then you are at fault for believing p
anyway, but you may have weak evidence for a huge number of propositions, and yet not at all be
epistemically at fault for failing to believe them all. This is similar to the practical case in which having
reason against renders you blameworthy for doing so anyway, while having for reason for does not imply
that you are blameworthy for failing to do so, because (for one thing) you may have other perfectly
acceptable options open to you.
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a good (perhaps the best) course of action. I analyse these deontic properties as
follows:
Required to U A is required to U if, and only if, some consideration(s), F,
give(s) A reason for U-ing and F also gives A sufficient reason
against W-ing16 (where W-ing is an alternative, or set of
alternatives to U-ing)
Ought to U A ought to U if, and only if, there is a set of considerations that
gives A greater reason to U
In what follows I explain these analyses further, argue that they are independently
plausible, and that they allow us to meet the two objections to the standard view. In
Sect. 4 I discuss my view in relation to other buck passing views.
3.1 Required to U
Intuitively, a requirement expresses the idea either of ruling out any alternative
course of action, or of ruling out a single action. This is not true for ‘ought’ claims.
In order to respect this difference, a key move that I make in distinguishing these
two deontic verdicts in my analyses, builds on the claim that a requirement is
typically concerned with, or takes as its object, both an act and its alternatives.
‘Ought’, on the other hand, is typically concerned only with, or takes as its object, a
single act, and bears on alternatives only indirectly.17
Given this way of understanding a requirement, I need to defend the claim that a
consideration that favours U-ing in the analysis of a requirement itself also counts
against those actions that conflict with U-ing. For example, according to me, if A is
required to keep her promise to B, then that A promised B that A would return B’s
£10 this afternoon counts against A’s going to the cinema if, and only if, going to
the cinema is a way of reneging on that promise.
By contrast, I claim, if A merely ought to visit the restaurant on the basis of its
tasty fare, then that the restaurant’s fare is tasty does not count against, say, A’s
going to the cinema, even if going to the cinema is a way of not going to the
restaurant. In cases like this, the explanation why A should go to the restaurant is
given by the fact that A has a good reason to go. On the other hand, promise-giving
reasons count, in addition, against performing alternative actions, not just because
there is something better to do, but because promise-giving reasons bear directly on
those alternatives.
The intuition I’m trying to elicit is that the tastiness of the fare at the restaurant
doesn’t give A reason against going to the cinema, but the fact that A promised to
return the £10 this afternoon does give A reason against going to the cinema this
afternoon. These latter sorts of considerations do more than just make some option,
16 In the sense of sufficient reason defined above.
17 As may be obvious already, this distinguishes requirements from normative reasons, given my
adherence to the asymmetry of the for/against reason-relations. Normative reasons bring to bear a single
valence on a single act, while requirements bring to bear different valences to multiple acts.
3200 E. K. H. Metz
123
so to speak, attractive: they themselves count against other competing options.
Thus, there appears to be a structural difference between pleasure-based and
promise-based reasons. The object of a pleasure-based reason is the consideration
that reason favours or disfavours.18 The object of a promise-based reason is wider,
ranging over both the act favoured/disfavoured, and the alternatives. Or, so at least,
appears intuitive given the examples.
Note that the fact that A promised to return the £10 gives A reason against going
to the cinema only if going to the cinema conflicts with A’s being able, within a
reasonable amount of time, to return the £10 to B. But isn’t that true of any reason?
For example, isn’t the fact that going to the cinema is enjoyable is a reason to go,
and not to do whatever would conflict with going?
Here is one way of spelling out the difference: we could say that the fact that the
cinema is more enjoyable than going to the restaurant is a reason not to go to the
restaurant. But, again, that is just to say that the reason to go to the restaurant is
stronger than the reason to go to the cinema. We are expressing the fact that there is
reason of some strength to go to the cinema, and reason of weaker strength to go to
the restaurant, and so conclude, on balance, that A should go to the cinema rather
than the restaurant. We should not say that the fact that going to the cinema (now) is
enjoyable is a reason not to go to the restaurant (now) because that reason does not
bear directly on that alternative.
But there is a subtle difference in the way we express a requirement. It is not
merely that there are reasons favouring U-ing and reasons favouring W-ing and what
A is required to do is given by the fact that A has a stronger reason to U. The fact
that A promised to return the £10 (now) is also a reason not to do whatever conflicts
with giving back the £10. Here the same consideration both favours U-ing and
disfavours W-ing. Thus it seems that requirements express the claim that you should
do something both because the balance of reasons falls on one side, and that those
reasons that fall on one side themselves also count against (bear on) acting
otherwise.
We can make this point clearer by applying the distinction between reasons for
and reasons against to these cases. As I claimed above, we should accept that
reasons display a kind of asymmetry. Where A has reason against acting in some
way, all else being equal she is appropriately subject to negative personal reactive
attitudes, perhaps in light of her recognition of this reason. On the other hand, where
A has reason for acting in some way, and A decides not to act in that way, A may be
appropriately subject only to negative self-reactive attitudes.
There is, however, a problem for my analysis. Suppose that there is nothing to be
said for doing X, but it is not as bad as Y or Z. Given the distinction between
reasons for and reasons against, A could not be required to X. But surely you can be
required to perform your least bad option? Suppose that the only difference between
the three options is the degree of harm that they will cause to B, with X causing the
least amount of harm, Y more, and Z still more. There is nothing to be said for doing
18 Again, given the assumption that Snedegar’s ‘‘opportunity cost’’ principle is false, which I have argued
above that we have good reason to believe.
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any of these things. However, A has no further choices—these are the only options
open to him.
We can get around this objection by dropping the condition that if you are
required to do something, there must be something to be said for doing that thing:
Required to U * A is required to U if, and only if, there is some
consideration(s), F, that gives A sufficient reason against
W-ing
Thus although requirements are typically concerned with both an act and its
alternatives, there can be cases in which you must perform your least bad option.
Required* reflects this.
Consider now the following, second, objection to Required. Suppose that the fact
that it is sunny outside gives A sufficient reason to go to the plaza, sufficient reason
against going to the cinema, and sufficient reason against staying at home. And
suppose that these are the only options available to A now. Since there is a
consideration that gives A reason to U, which also itself gives A reason not to act in
any of the ways that conflict with A’s U-ing, where the set of options is reduced to
these three, Required tells us that A is required to go to the plaza. But, in an intuitive
sense, A is not subject to a requirement to go to the plaza. So Required is false
because its extension is incorrect.
First, the case is potentially misleading. That it is sunny outside is a reason for
going outside, not a reason against staying in, at least according to my schema of
reasons. To count against acting in some way, a consideration must make
appropriate negative reactive attitudes for acting in that way, highlighting a negative
quality of the action. But that it is sunny outside just doesn’t bear on staying inside,
in the sense that missing out on something there is reason for is not itself a reason
against.
Second, we need to specify more precisely what the relevant grounds are in this
case. Suppose that the ground is the pleasure you get from being in the sun. Then
according to me that pleasure gives you a reason to go to the plaza, but does not
count as a reason against staying in or going to the cinema. So the claim ‘It is sunny
outside’ really conceals a positive and negative aspect which allows us to truthfully
say that it gives you a reason to go outside and a reason against staying in. Once we
separate the negative and positive aspects we see that it is not really true that the
very same consideration counts both for acting in some way and against acting on
conflicting alternatives.
Third, I don’t find cases that severely limit the alternatives open to an agent to be
particularly illuminating. In reality, we have a very large number of alternatives
open to us at any one time, and given this very large number, having sufficient
reason against each of these relevant alternatives looks relevant to what one is
required to do. The most obvious cases that do make available only a very small set
of alternatives are those that involve restricted agency or coercion. But in these sorts
of cases, the external factor that limits an agent’s alternatives to a small set will
likely itself imply that the situated agent is no longer in realm of ‘‘mere’’ choice.
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3.2 Required not to U
My analysis of a requirement, however, is incomplete. Clearly requirements not to
act in some way cannot be modelled on my analysis of requirements for acting in
some way, because they rule out acting in one way, not all alternatives to acting in
that way. The most obvious view here is the following:
Required not to U A is required not to U if, and only if, (i) some
consideration(s), F, give A sufficient reason against U-
ing, and that reason has a significant degree of strength
Requirements not to do something in effect say simply ‘Do not do this’. According
to my analysis, such requirements are expressed through the conjunction of two
claims: first, that A has sufficient reason against U-ing, i.e. that the reasons against
A’s U-ing win out against the reasons for A’s U-ing. Second, those considerations
are of a significant strength. That is, not only is A subject to negative reactive
attitudes for U-ing but the strength of those attitudes is significant enough to identify
this as a case in which A is required not to U.19
However, my definition of a requirement not to do something cannot be right as it
stands. Consider again a scenario in which you must perform your least bad option.
Assuming that you have sufficient reason against performing each of these options,
and that there are no reasons favouring any of the options, according to my
definition of a requirement not to U, as it stands, you are required not to perform any
of these options. Furthermore, according to Required to U* you are required to
perform your least bad option. That is an outright contradiction. Again, however, we
can easily amend the definition to take account of these cases as follows:
Required not to U* A is required not to U if, and only if, there is some
consideration(s), R, which give A sufficient reason not to
U and R has a significant degree of strength, unless U-ing
is the only way that A can avoid W-ing, and there is
sufficient reason not to W of greater strength
With this modification in mind, we should note some further differences between
requirements not to U and requirements to U.
The questions ‘What am I required to do now?’ and ‘What am I required not to
do now?’ raise different issues. In the first case, an answer places you under a
19 Note that this view is not inconsistent with absolute prohibitions. To say that U-ing is absolutely
prohibited is to say that there sufficient reason for A not to U and there is no consideration that could
justify A’s U-ing. It is helpful here to appeal to the distinction between requirements considered
synchronically versus requirements considered diachronically. Even though it may be true at t1 that you
are required not to U, it may be false at t2 that you are required not to U because new information comes
to light or a new reason is created. But in saying that a consideration could not justify A’s U-ing (absolute
prohibition) we mean that at no time will it be false that A is required not to U. We should also say that in
a situation in which the only options open to A are to U or to W, where there is sufficient reason against
W-ing, unless W is also absolutely prohibited, there is (by hypothesis) stronger reason for A not to U.
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demand to perform a single action, and only a single action.20 In the second case, an
answer may place you under a demand not to perform many actions, or many
demands not to perform many different actions. It is a defensible view that you
cannot, at t1, be required to do more than one thing. It is a platitude that you can, at
t1, be required not to do more than one thing.
Another difference between acts and omissions, with respect to their normative
status, is that when considering whether to perform some act, comparison classes
are often important. Often you decide whether to X rather than Y or Z. When we
deliberate over omissions, on the other hand, comparison classes are often of less
significance. Usually when deliberation involves omissions it is by implicit or
explicit reference to an action that is incompatible with that omission, as when we
ask ‘Should I, or should I not go to the cinema?’ or ‘Should I not go to the cinema
(and rather stay in and watch TV) or should I go out to meet my friend?’.
In general then, when considering acts, practical reasoning may include both
considerations for and against acting in that way, and that value balanced against the
considered value of acting in other ways. Being required to U, or that A ought to U,
involves weighing competing reasons for competing actions (this may be why there
is conceptual pressure to accept that there is an ‘ought, all-things-considered’). On
the other hand, having sufficient reason not to act in some way involves (a) only
competing reasons for and against that omission and (b) that there can be multiple
non-competing ‘most reason’ verdicts supporting different omissions.
I claim that to be required not to act in some way is for there to be sufficient
reason not to act in that way of significant strength. To have sufficient reason not to
act in some way is for there to be more reason against U-ing than for U-ing, and to
have reason against U-ing is to explain why A, in U-ing, is appropriately subject to
negative reactive attitudes. Such negative attitudes, however, can take different
forms, and the way in which criticism differs can in part determine what counts as
‘significant’ for the purposes of requirement.21 For example, consider the difference
between prudential and moral reasons: I have prudential reason to avoid acting in a
way that causes harm to me, if I do it. I have moral reason to avoid acting in a way
that causes harm to you, if I do it.
In the first case, we might construe this in broadly teleological terms: I have
reason not to cause myself to be harmed because of the badness of harm. I am
subject to criticism on the basis of my failure to care about the badness of the harm.
In the second case, it is less plausible that this can be entirely captured in
teleological terms. It is not merely my failure to recognise the badness of harm that
forms the basis of appropriate criticism against me. It is also the fact that it is your
body that gives me reason to care about avoiding causing you harm. So I am also
criticisable on two fronts. One front is associated with the teleological reason
20 I assume here that an agent can only perform a single action at a time, where a single action can be
‘complex’ in the sense that it can include separable parts. For example, your drinking the water and
raising your finger at the same time count as a single action though you could drink the water without
raising your finger and vice versa. We should also be careful to distinguish actions and omissions here.
21 I say ‘‘can determine’’ here as I am not attempting to offer the final word on this, and am quite open to
alternative interpretations of how we should understand the ‘‘significant degree of strength’’.
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against promoting harm, and another is associated with a respect-based reason
against harming agents.
We can also note the difference between cases in which you have sufficient
reason against, for which there are no reasons for, and cases in which you have
sufficient reason against, for which there are reasons for. In the latter case one may
be susceptible to misplacing or misconstruing the respective weights involved in the
reasons bearing on that action. You may be more likely to mistakenly suppose that
you can waive criticism in acting in that way because there is something to be said
for doing so. In cases of the first sort, however, such mistakes seem more serious.
That there is nothing whatsoever to be said for acting in that way makes acting in
that way less understandably waivable by the agent.
Obviously, when considering requirements not to U, our criticisms will be strong.
But is the difference between a moral requirement not to murder, and a prudential
requirement not to cause myself some bodily discomfort reflected solely in terms of
the strength of reasons against?
To answer this question let us examine whether we should appeal to the idea that
reasons also play a dual-role where they figure in requirements not to U. We could
claim that moral reasons which figure in negative requirements also play the role of
shaping an agent’s dispositions in the following way: that it would harm an
autonomous agent gives you reason not just not to U but, in addition, gives you
reason to aim to act in morally laudable ways. However, I don’t think we should be
committed to this view. We should leave it open whether we ought to construe
morality in minimal terms, for instance as a number of constraints on action. This
minimal understanding of morality simply has nothing to say about what, positively,
you should do, but merely rules out certain ways of acting.
Now consider reasons for demands. Suppose that you try to harm me. I thus have
reason to demand that you refrain from doing so. This is a reason which may even
be waivable by me. If I decide to relinquish my demand I may have no complaint
against you in harming me. In other cases it may be true (a) that I have reason to
demand that you refrain from U-ing and (b) that others have reason to demand that
you refrain from U-ing. So the fact that it would harm me is both a strong reason not
to do it and a strong reason for others to (legitimately) demand that you not do it.22
On one plausible interpretation, reasons for are generally waivable, reasons
against are not. But, further, an agent can only waive his own reasons, he cannot
waive the reasons that others have. For example, that some act would cause you
harm gives me strong reason not to do it, and reason for you to demand that I refrain
from doing it, I cannot waive either reason: because (i) it is a reason against (and
thus makes appropriate negative reactive attitudes) and (ii) because an agent cannot
waive another agent’s reason. That is at least one plausible line that we could take in
distinguishing moral from prudential requirements, in addition to a difference in the
strengths and kinds of the grounding reasons.
If we appeal to intuition about what would count as appropriate criticism it seems
plausible that you are not appropriately subject to negative reactive attitudes for
22 See Wallace (2013: 150–8) for further discussion on this point.
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failing to do what you had less-than-most reason to do (as long as you do what you
had most reason to do).
4 Rival views and ought
Although the literature on deontic buck-passing is slight, with only one theory
explicitly advanced in the recent literature,23 Justin Snedegar has helpfully shown
how a number of different theories of reasons can be utilised to provide different
buck passing views.24 All of the views that he considers are built on the basis of a
common claim—that normative reasons can be distinguished into two kinds. Given
that a desideratum of a good buck passing view is to be able to distinguish cases like
Lunch and Theatre a distinction among reasons can, the thought goes, be mapped
structurally onto the distinction among deontic verdicts—between ought and
requirement.
There are a number of such putative distinctions among reasons on the market.
Matt Bedke distinguishes between reasons for acting, and reasons to perform speech
acts (reasons for others to respond to the agent in certain ways).25 Joshua Gert
distinguishes between reasons which require acting, and reasons which justify
acting.26 Joseph Raz distinguishes between first and second order reasons.27
We can use these distinctions to build buck passing views that respect the
difference between the deontic verdict appropriate in Lunch from the verdict
appropriate in Theatre. However, the fundamental problem, identified by Snedegar,
shared by the resultant views, is that because each distinction among reasons is
conceptually independent, that implies that the deontic verdicts that they reduce do
not bear structural relations as a matter of conceptual necessity to one another.28
Moreover, some of the theorists who defend these distinctions—notably Gert and
Bedke—insist that the kinds of reasons that they identify are conceptually
independent of each other.
This would not matter if ought and requirement did not bear structural relations
to one another; however it is very plausible that they do. If you are required to act in
some way, this entails that you ought to do it. But if you ought to act in some way,
this does not entail that you are required to act in that way.
Snedegar’s response to this problem is to build in both kinds of reason into the
stronger deontic verdict (requirement). For example, an interpretation of Bedke’s
analysis of requirement is:
23 Which is due to Matt Bedke. See Bedke (2011).
24 See Snedegar (2016).
25 Bedke (2011).
26 Gert (2003). Again, his distinction maps on to Greenspan’s negative/positive reasons distinction.
Douglas Portmore makes use of a similar distinction in Portmore (2011).
27 See, for example, Raz (1975).
28 Snedegar (2016: 175–7).
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Bedkerequired A is required to U if, and only if, (i) A has most reason to U, and
(ii) there is most reason to require A to U29
While ‘ought’ is defined simply in terms of what A has most reason to do. The
immediate problem with this move is that condition (i) appears to be unmotivated—
it is just added into get the right result.
One way to respond here is to follow Stephen Darwall in arguing that it is just
incoherent to require somebody to act in a way that fails to be supported by what
they have reason to do, because we cannot blame somebody for this.30 Snedegar
points out, however, that a new problem emerges—it seems possible to suppose
both that existence-internalism about reasons is true and that we can require an
agent to act in a way that does not serve their desires. But this combination of views
is ruled out by Bedkerequired. Thus, again, what is needed is an explanation of the
conceptual relations between the two kinds of reasons identified—why must it be
the case that we have reason to require you to U only if you have most reason to
U?31
My view, however, avoids the need to answer this question, since according to
my analyses, what it is to be required to do something is that you have most reason
against acting on the alternatives. The conceptual relationship between requiring
and having most reason is built into the view, without the need to appeal to requiring
reasons.
Second, by appealing to the reasons for/against distinction, we can make use of a
distinction among reasons, while at the same time retaining a clear conceptual
relation between the two reasons. That is because reasons for and reasons against
are not fully conceptually independent due to the role that reasons for and against
must play in reasoning.
Judgements about what an agent has most reason to do or believe involve the
weighing and balancing of reasons for and against. That is, the weighing of reasons,
for and against, is partly constitutive of reasoning. This is true anyway,
independently of the truth of the asymmetry claim about reasons. Now, clearly,
given the truth of the latter claim, weighing and balancing reasons is more
complicated than that suggested by the metaphor of a mechanical scale, with
weights on either side. But many theorists have come to recognise that the notion of
weighing must be more complex than that anyway.32
Note that the putative kinds of reasons identified above are not constitutive of
reasoning in the same way. One can have justifying reasons for and against acting
in some way, and requiring reason for and against acting in some way. Or, one can
have requiring reasons for and against requiring somebody to respond in some way.
Each of the distinctions broached above cuts across the for/against distinction.
29 Snedegar (2016: 175).
30 See Darwall (2006, ch.6).
31 Snedegar (2016: 176–7). .
32 See, for example Dancy (2004a, b), Lord and Maguire (2016).
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In order to demonstrate how my view guarantees the desired entailments, let us
now consider my analysis of ‘ought’:
Ought to U A ought to U if, and only if, there is a set of considerations that
gives A greater reason to U
Again, just as requirements not to act in some way cannot be modelled on the
analysis of requirements for acting in some way, that you ought not cannot be
modelled on its being the case that you ought:
Ought not to U A ought not to U if, and only if, A has greatest reason to W
(where W-ing is an alternative, or set of alternatives to U-ing)
What the claim that A ought to U is intended to express is that some course of action
is either a good, or the best option from some set of alternatives (ought to U) or that,
of some set of actions, A should do otherwise than U-ing (ought not to U). Note that
one way in which ‘ought not to U’ differs from having a requirement not to perform
some action is that, if A ought not to U, there may be some reasons in favour of U-
ing, but there is still more to be said for every alternative. On the other hand, where
A ought to U, she is not required to U because the considerations that give her
reason to U do not also rule out those considerations that conflict with her U-ing.
It is important to note that my analysis of the claim that A ought not to do
something does not include reasons against. That is because, as I have tried to make
clear, the presence of reasons against implies that it is appropriate to hold negative
reactive attitudes either from the first person, or third person perspective (however
weak and potentially excusable). Thus, I have avoided analysing ‘A ought not to U’
in terms of reasons against in order to avoid collapsing this analysis into Required
not to U. So, on my analysis is it true that if A is required to U, this entails that A
ought to U, but not vice versa?
First, it should be clear that Required to U entails Ought to U, since if A has
sufficient reason not to do otherwise than U-ing, then A has more net reason to U
than to W, as her reasons against defeat any reasons for any conflicting action.
Conversely, Ought to U clearly does not entail Required to U, since being required
to U entails all of A’s alternatives to U-ing being ruled out, which Ought to U does
not imply. So the desired entailments are preserved here.
What about the entailment from Required not to U to Ought not to U? I defined
‘ought not to U’ as having reason to do otherwise. If it can be the case that A is
required not to do something, and it can be the case that A does not have reason to
do otherwise, then the desired entailments between Ought not to U and Required not
to U are not preserved. But, as we have seen above given the modified version of
requirement not to U (Required not to U*) it could not be the case both that you are
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required not to do something and that there is not greater reason to do otherwise. So
the entailments are preserved here too.
5 Resolving the supererogation problem
The second difficulty with standard view is that it appeared to conceptually rule out
supererogation. Suppose that A has sufficient reason to sacrifice her life to save five
people in a burning building. It seems plausible to suppose that such a reason could
outweigh opposing reasons A has, i.e. it seems possible that A can have most reason
to perform a supererogatory act, in this sense. According to the standard view, A
therefore ought to sacrifice herself to save the five (where I am again using ‘ought’
in an intuitive sense). But it is a conceptual truth that, even though it would be
morally laudable to do so, it cannot be the case that you ought to perform a
supererogatory action. Thus, the standard view rules out the conceptual possibility
of supererogation.
When we use the term ‘ought’ we can sometimes mean ‘required’. According to
my analysis of ‘ought to U’, for it to be the case that A ought to U, is just for A to
have most reason to U. That removes the problematic inference on the picture drawn
above. If you have most reason to perform a supererogatory action, it is false that
you are required to perform that action, though it may be that you ought to, in the
sense that it is your best option.
It may be objected that my analysis only defers the objection. According to my
analysis, if it true both that F gives A sufficient reason to U and F gives A sufficient
reason not to act in any way that conflicts with U-ing, then A is required to U. If it is
possible that U-ing counts as a supererogatory act, my analysis similarly rules out
supererogation.
Suppose that A can save the lives of five people only by risking their own life by
entering the burning building. If the fact that it would save five lives counts
decisively in favour of risking their own life by entering the building, and that fact
also decisively counts against any alternative, then according to my analysis A is
required to enter the building. I think, however, that the crucial difference between a
supererogatory act and a required act lies in whether or not that fact counts
decisively against A’s alternatives. In this case, although the fact that it would save
five lives does plausibly count against A’s refraining from entering the building; that
fact does not plausibly count decisively against that alternative. The same intuition
that motivates our belief that this is a supererogatory act should motivate the denial
of the claim that the fact that A will save five lives counts decisively against their
risking their own life.
However, we can allow that A has most reason to save the five in that he has
sufficient reason to save the five (A’s reasons for saving the five outweigh the
reasons against saving the five) and greater reason to save the five (A has more
reason to save the five than to do anything else). Still, according to my analysis, A is
not required to save the five. A is only required to save the five if (and only if) the
consideration that gives him reason to save the five also counts decisively against
the alternative courses of action. That is, it can still be true, on my analysis that A
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has most reason to perform a supererogatory act, but that A is not required to act in
that way.
Further, I find it difficult to imagine what content there could be to claiming that
such an act would be required. As I have already argued, to act ‘in the teeth’ of
reasons against is different from acting on the basis of reasons which favour acting
in some way. Decisive reasons against imply a strong form of criticism for flouting
what they disfavour. But we are to suppose that in this case it is not reasonable to
criticise you for failing to sacrifice yourself. Given that these two claims seem
inconsistent together, we have reason to reject the possibility: supererogatory acts
which represent your best option can make it the case that you ought to perform
them, in the sense above, but they cannot be required in my sense.
6 Conclusion
My version of the deontic buck-passing view makes use of a distinction among
normative reasons to reduce the deontic properties of ought and requirement to
reasons. This view allows us to capture the different deontic verdicts in Lunch and
Theatre above, and does so in a way that captures the structural relations between
these verdicts. This gives the view an advantage over the most prominent rival view,
due to Bedke. Finally, the view avoids the supererogation problem by making room
for supererogatory acts, by clearly distinguishing what an agent can be required to
do, from what an agent ought to do.
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